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On the effect of foreign aid on corruption
Abstract
The Okada & Samreth(2012, EL) finding that  aid deters  corruption could have an 
important  influence  on  policy  and  academic  debates.  This  paper  partially  negates  their 
criticism  of  the  mainstream  approach  to  the  aid-development  nexus.  Using  updated 
data(1996-2010) from 52 African countries  we provide robust  evidence of a positive aid-
corruption  nexus.  Development  assistance  fuels(mitigates)  corruption(the  control  of 
corruption) in the African continent. As a policy implication, the Okada & Samreth(2012, EL) 
finding for developing countries may not be relevant for  Africa. 
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1.Introduction
The  purpose  of  this  comment  is  to  stress  some  policy  and  methodological  issues 
resulting  from  Okada  &  Samreth(2012).  The  methodological  basis  of  the  paper  is  the 
following:  “previous research has primarily been based on Ordinary Least Squares(OLS),  
instrumental variables and panel estimation. These approaches have disadvantages, as they  
only estimate the parameters of interest at the mean evaluation  by a conditional distribution  
of the dependent variable(Billger & Goel,2009)”(p.240).  To confirm this assertion we peruse 
Billger & Goel(2009) and find the following: “ many previous studies of the determinants of  
corruption  employ  OLS  estimation,  therefore  reporting  parameters  estimates  at  the  
conditional mean of corruption. While mean effects are certainly important, we expand upon  
such  findings  using  quantile  regression.  In  addition,  on  underlying  assumption  for  OLS  
regression is that the error term and the dependent variables are normally distributed…..OLS  
estimation can yield unreliable estimates, but quantile regression does not require a normally  
distributed error term”(pp.300-301). Three facts result from this cross-examination:
- Billger & Goel(2009) do not invalidate panel instrumental variable estimation techniques;
-if the classical conditions for the validity of OLS are satisfied, that is, if the error term is  
independently  and  identically  distributed,  conditional  on  the  independent  variables,  then 
quantile regression  is redundant: all the conditional quantiles of the dependent variable will 
march in lockstep with the conditional mean;
-while  the  Okada & Samreth(2012)  criticism is  valid  with  respect  to  OLS,  it  is  short  of 
substance when extended to some instrumental and dynamic panel estimation techniques. 
In this comment we assess the effect of foreign aid on corruption using two panel 
estimation techniques in the context of Africa. The choice of Africa is based on the substantial 
reliance of the continent on the ‘Big-Push’ development(poverty-reduction) policy.  The rest 
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of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and outlines the methodology. 
Section 3 covers the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
2.Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
We investigate a panel of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators  (ADI)  of  the  World  Bank (WB)  ranging  from  1996  to  2010.  Okada  & 
Samreth(2012) have used data(1995 to 2009) from 120 developing countries. The outcome 
variables  are   the  ‘control  of  corruption’  and  the  ‘corruption  perception’  indexes.  The 
explaining variable is Net Official Development Assistance(NODA). For robustness checks 
we use total  NODA, NODA from Multilateral  donors and NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee(DAC) countries.  In the estimations  we control  for  openness(trade), 
autocracy and democracy.  The choice of control variables is contingent on the degrees of 
freedom necessary for overidentifying restrictions tests at second-stage regressions(more than 
two control  variables  will  result  in exact  or under-identification;  meaning instruments  are 
either equal to or less than the number of endogenous explaining variables respectively). The 
aid  and  trade  variables  are  in  percentage  of  GDP.  Instrumental  variables  include:  legal-
origins, income-levels and religious-dominations. These instruments have been substantially 
documented in the economic development literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003). 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Endogeneity 
While  development  assistance  affects  the  quality  of  institutions  in  the  recipient 
countries, some foreign-aid is also contingent on the  quality of institutions in the beneficiary 
countries.  We  are  thus  faced  with  an  important  issue  of  endogeneity  owing  to  reverse-
causality  and omitted  variables.  To address  this  concern  we shall  assess  the  presence  of 
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endogeneity with the Hausman-test and selection of  estimation technique will depend on the 
outcome of the test. 
2.2.2 Estimation techniques  
a) HAC  Two-Stage Least Squares(TSLS) Instrumental Variables(IV) 
The TSLS is preceded by the Hausman test for endogeneity. The null hypothesis of 
this test is the stance that OLS estimates are efficient and consistent; therefore a rejection of 
this null hypothesis points to the presence of endogeneity and hence an estimation approach 
that incorporates it. Before estimation we verify that the instruments are exogenous to the 
endogenous  components  of  explaining  variables(aid  channels)  conditional  on  other 
covariates(control variables). Borrowing from Beck et al.(2003) with use the TSLS-IV with 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent(HAC) standard errors. The validity of the 
instruments  is  assessed  by  the  Sargan  Overidentifying  Restrictions(OIR)  test.  The  null 
hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments are not correlated with the error term 
in the equation of interest(do not suffer from endogeneity). 
b) System Generalized Methods of Moments(Dynamic Panel) 
Blundell & Bond(1998) proposed another approach to the issue of endogeneity with 
an  application  of  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments(GMM)  that  exploits  all  the 
orthogonality  conditions  between  the  dependent  lagged  variables  and the  error  term.  We 
prefer the second-step GMM since it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the first-
step  the residuals are homoscedastic. The hypothesis of no auto-correlation in residuals is 
crucial as past differenced  variables are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. 
This  concern  is  addressed  with  the  second-order  autocorrelation  test:  AR(2).  Also  the 
estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the outcome variable and 
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other  explaining  variables  are  valid  instruments  in  the  estimation.  The  validity  of  the 
instruments is investigated by the Sargan over-identifying restrictions  test(OIR).
2.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis,  the following checks will  be carried out: (1) 
usage of alternative NODA indicators ; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of 
moment conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) usage of alternative 
corruption indicators; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity; (5) estimation with robust 
Heteroscedasticity  and Autocorrelation  Consistent(HAC) standard errors;(6)  application  of 
restricted and unrestricted regressions. 
3.Empirical results 
3.1 Instrumental panel(TSLS)
Table 1 below presents results  in HAC standard errors for restricted(panel  A) and 
unrestricted(panel B) TSLS-IV regressions. Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test in all regressions confirms the presence of endogeneity and hence the choice of the IV 
estimation approach. Failure to reject the hull hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR test lends credit 
to the validity of the instruments. Clearly, it could be noticed that foreign aid significantly 
diminishes the control of corruption and the CPI. Reduction in the  CPI indicates increase in 
corruption(see  Transparency International  CPI computation). These results are robust to the 
alternative set of instrumental variables. 
3.2 Dynamic Panel(System GMM) 
Table 2 presents dynamic panel system GMM estimation results for restricted(panel 
A) and unrestricted(panel B) regressions. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of the AR(2) 
and  Sargan-OIR  tests  for  the  most  part  confirms  the  absence  of  autocorrelation  in  the 
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residuals and validity of the instruments respectively.  The results broadly confirm those in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable regressions 
Panel A: Restricted  regressions(HAC standard errors)
Control of Corruption Corruption Perception Index(CPI)
NODAgdp -0.035*** --- --- -0.032* --- ---
(0.000) (0.060)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.082*** --- --- -0.074* ---
(0.000) (0.068)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.062*** --- --- -0.058*
(0.000) (0.057)
Democracy 0.101* 0.119* 0.087 0.261 0.275 0.248
(0.086) (0.078) (0.116) (0.105) (0.104) (0.110)
Autocracy -0.032 -0.000 -0.058 0.171 0.200 0.145
(0.773) (0.999) (0.575) (0.516) (0.459) (0.577)
Trade -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 0.027* 0.025* 0.028**
(0.223) (0.169) (0.322) (0.050) (0.075) (0.035)
Hausman 234.028*** 255.223*** 233.669*** 501.364*** 495.951*** 504.967***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan-OIR 0.024 0.109 0.000 2.122 2.290 1.982
(0.875) (0.741) (0.996) (0.145) (0.130) (0.159)
Adjusted R² 0.106 0.098 0.094 0.180 0.177 0.178
Fisher 16.099*** 14.177*** 17.011*** 148.337*** 158.260*** 138.526***
Observations 488 488 488 368 368 368
Panel B: Unrestricted  Regressions(HAC standard errors)
Control of Corruption Corruption Perception Index
Constant -0.631*** -0.649*** -0.621*** 2.782*** 2.727*** 2.813***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NODAgdp -0.023** --- --- -0.068*** --- ---
(0.014) (0.000)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.053** --- --- -0.150*** ---
(0.017) (0.000)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.041** --- --- -0.125***
(0.013) (0.000)
Democracy 0.105** 0.107** 0.104** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.252***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman 49.346*** 50.302*** 49.910*** 115.635*** 118.12*** 118.09***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan-OIR 0.039 0.695 0.214 2.383 2.086 3.825
(0.980) (0.706) (0.898) (0.303) (0.352) (0.147)
Adjusted R² 0.177 0.172 0.167 0.241 0.235 0.225
Fisher 6.416*** 6.315*** 6.400*** 21.499*** 20.853*** 21.255***
Observations 514 514 514 388 388 388
First-Set of Instruments Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  OIR:  Overidentifying  Restrictions  test.  NODAgdp:  NODA  on  GDP.  
NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. P-values in brackets. 
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Table 2: Dynamic System GMM regressions 
Panel A: Restricted  regressions
Control of Corruption Corruption Perception Index
Initial 0.785*** 0.789*** 0.790*** 0.873*** 0.870*** 0.874***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NODAgdp -0.005*** --- --- 0.005 --- ---
(0.004) (0.108)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.010** --- --- 0.015* ---
(0.042) (0.081)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.007*** --- --- 0.008
(0.001) (0.130)
Democracy 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.045* 0.045** 0.046*
(0.576) (0.694) (0.873) (0.055) (0.022) (0.055)
AR(2) 1.324 1.272 1.366 1.812* 1.821* 1.799*
(0.185) (0.203) (0.171) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072)
Sargan-OIR 47.079 46.156 45.410 44.902 44.891 44.769
(0.347) (0.383) (0.413) (0.966) (0.966) (0.967)
Wald 547.996*** 420.894*** 648.423*** 6836.4*** 6437.15*** 6876.4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 334 334 334 335 335 335
Panel B: Unrestricted  regressions
Control of Corruption Corruption Perception Index
Initial 0.681*** 0.668*** 0.689*** 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.780***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.250*** -0.267*** -0.248*** 0.597*** 0.594*** 0.582***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
NODAgdp -0.001*** --- --- -0.003 --- ---
(0.005) (0.148)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.003 --- --- -0.008 ---
(0.133) (0.153)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.002*** --- --- -0.005
(0.005) (0.144)
Democracy 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.024**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019)
AR(2) 1.353 1.332 1.347 1.943* 1.933* 1.949*
(0.175) (0.182) (0.177) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
Sargan-OIR 46.024 45.935 45.431 44.569 44.553 44.759
(0.388) (0.392) (0.412) (0.969) (0.969) (0.967)
Wald 175.78*** 137.485*** 172.401*** 377.631*** 376.473*** 385.711***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 334 334 334 335 335 335
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  OIR:  Overidentifying  Restrictions  test.  NODAgdp:  NODA  on  GDP.  
NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. AR(2): Second order auto correlation test. Wald: statistics for joint significance of estimated coefficients. Initial: lagged 
endogenous variable. P-values in brackets.
4. Conclusion 
The Okada & Samreth(2012,  EL) finding that  aid deters corruption could have an 
important  influence  on  policy  and  academic  debates.  This  paper  partially  negates  their 
criticism  of  the  mainstream  approach  to  the  aid-development  nexus.  Using  updated 
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data(1996-2010) from 52 African countries  we provide robust  evidence of a positive aid-
corruption  nexus.  Development  assistance  fuels(mitigates)  corruption(the  control  of 
corruption) in the African continent. As a policy implication, the Okada & Samreth(2012, EL) 
finding for developing countries may not be relevant for  Africa. 
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